Abstract-This paper establishes an off-policy integral reinforcement learning (IRL) method to solve nonlinear continuous-time (CT) nonzero-sum (NZS) games with unknown system dynamics. The IRL algorithm is presented to obtain the iterative control and off-policy learning is used to allow the dynamics to be completely unknown. Off-policy IRL is designed to do policy evaluation and policy improvement in the policy iteration algorithm. Critic and action networks are used to obtain the performance index and control for each player. The gradient descent algorithm makes the update of critic and action weights simultaneously. The convergence analysis of the weights is given. The asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system and the existence of Nash equilibrium are proved. The simulation study demonstrates the effectiveness of the developed method for nonlinear CT NZS games with unknown system dynamics.
Off-Policy Integral Reinforcement Learning Method to Solve Nonlinear Continuous-Time Multiplayer Nonzero-Sum Games attention and has been widely used in economic theory and other social and behavioral sciences [2] [3] [4] [5] . Nonzerosum (NZS) games with N players rely on solving the coupled Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equations, which means each player decides for the Nash equilibrium depending on HJ equations coupled through their quadratic terms. In linear NZS games, they get reduced to coupled algebraic Riccati equations [6] .
In nonlinear NZS games, it is difficult and even they do not have analytic solutions. Therefore, many intelligent methods are proposed to obtain the approximate solutions [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Reinforcement learning (RL), one of the most powerful machine learning methods [12] , allows an agent or controller to learn the optimal control policies based on the observed responses from the environment or system [13] [14] [15] [16] . In continuous-time (CT) framework, the RL algorithms were developed without any proof of stability and convergence at first in [17] and [18] . After that, integral RL (IRL), which is based on the integral temporal difference and uses RL ideas to find the value of the parameters of the infinite horizon performance index function [19] , has been one of the focus areas in the theory of optimal control [20] , [21] .
In IRL, the iteration is related to finding the online solution of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation to solve the nonlinear optimal control problems [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . Moreover, IRL is conceptually based on the policy iteration (PI) technique [27] , [28] . PI has two parts: 1) policy evaluation and 2) policy improvement. Hence, it is an iterative approach to solving the HJB equation by constructing a sequence of stabilizing control policies that converge to the optimal control solution. In recent work, reference [29] presented global adaptive dynamic programming (ADP), which relaxes the problem of solving HJB equation to an optimization problem, and neural network approximation in previous ADP is avoided. Meanwhile, other methods are also proposed to obtain the optimal control adaptively [30] [31] [32] [33] . IRL allows the development of a Bellman equation that does not contain the system dynamics [34] [35] [36] [37] . It is worth noting that most of the IRL algorithms are on-policy, i.e., the performance index function is evaluated using system data generated with policies being evaluated. It means on-policy learning methods use the inaccurate data to learn the performance index function, which will increase the accumulated error. Off-policy IRL can learn the solution of HJB equation from the system data, which generated by an arbitrary control. Moreover, off-policy IRL can be regarded as a direct learning method for NZS games, which avoids the identification of system dynamics.
In [38] , a novel PI approach to finding online adaptive optimal controllers for CT linear systems with completely unknown system dynamics was presented. This paper gives idea of off-policy control for nonlinear systems. In [39] , an off-policy RL method was introduced to learn the solution of HJI equation of CT systems with completely unknown dynamics, from real system data instead of mathematical system model, and its convergence was proved. In [40] , an off-policy optimal control method was developed for unknown CT systems with unknown disturbances. These research studies are the foundation of our work. It is noted that the system dynamics is not known in advance in many multiplayer NZS games. This makes it difficult to obtain the Nash equilibrium depending on HJ equations for each player. Therefore, effective methods are required to develop to deal with the multiplayer NZS games with unknown dynamics. This motivates our research interest.
In this paper, an off-policy IRL method is studied for CT multiplayer NZS games with unknown dynamics. First, the PI algorithm is introduced with convergence analysis. Then off-policy is designed to policy evaluation and policy improvement without system dynamics. Neural networks are used to approximate critic and action networks. The update methods for neural networks weights are given. It is proved that the weight errors of neural networks are uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB). It is also proved that closed-loop system is asymptotically stable and the Nash equilibrium can be obtained. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) For nonlinear CT NZS games, off-policy Bellman equation is developed for policy updating without system dynamics. 2) It is proved that the weight errors of neural networks are UUB.
3) The asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system is proved. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the problem motivations and preliminaries are presented. In Section III, the multiplayer learning PI solution for NZS games is introduced. In Section IV, the off-policy IRL optimal control method is considered. In Section V, examples are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed optimal control scheme. In Section VI, the conclusion is drawn.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT Consider the following nonlinear system:
where the state x(t) ∈ R n and controls u j (t) ∈ R m . This system has N inputs or players, and they influence each other through their joint effects on the overall system state dynamics. The system functions f (x) and g(x) are unknown. Let containing the origin be a closed subset of R n to which all motions of (1) are restricted. Let f + N j =1 gu j be Lipschitz continuous on and that system (1) is stabilizable in the sense that there exists admissible control on that asymptotically stabilizes the system. Define u −i as the supplementary set of
Define the performance index function of player i as
where the utility function
Define the multiplayer differential game
This game implies that all the players have the same competitive hierarchical level and seek to attain a Nash equilibrium as given by the following definition. Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium [41] , [42] ): Policies
. . , u * N } are said to constitute a Nash equilibrium solution for the N-player game if
Then the N-tuple {J * 1 , J * 2 , . . . , J * N } is known as a Nash equilibrium value set or outcome of the N-player game.
III. MULTIPLAYER LEARNING PI SOLUTION
FOR NZS GAMES In this section, the PI solution for NZS games is introduced with convergence analysis. From Definition 1, it can be seen that if any player unilaterally changes his control policy while the policies of all other players remain the same, then that player will obtain worse performance. For fixed stabilizing feedback control policies u i and u −i , define the value function
Using the Leibniz formula, Hamiltonian function is given by the Bellman equation
Then the following policies can be yielded from (∂ H i /∂u i ) = 0:
Therefore, one obtains the N-coupled HJ equations
Algorithm 1 Policy Iteration
Step 1: Start with stabilizing initial policies u
Step 2: Given the N-tuple of policies u
Step 3: Update the N-tuple of control policies using
which explicitly is
Define the best response HJ equation as the Bellman equation (6) with control u * i given by (7) and arbitrary policies u −i as
In [6] , the following PI for N-player games has been proposed to solve (8) .
Here [0] and [k] in the superscript mean the iteration index. The following two theorems reveal that the convergence of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1: If is bounded, and the system functions f (x) and g(x) are known, the iterative control u [k] i of player i is obtained by PI algorithm in (10)- (12), and the controls u −i do not update their control policies. Then the iterative cost function is convergent, and the values converge to the best response HJ equation (9) .
Proof: Let
Since only player i updates its control, then let
Therefore, from (13) and (14), one has
and the current policies u −i , the orbital derivative becomeṡ
According to (13) , (16) 
From (15), it hasV
On the other side, as only player i updates its control, then
and from (10)
According to (18) and (20) 
It follows that [42] :
which means that V
i is a monotonically decreasing sequence.
i , according to [43] and [44] , it has Proof: Aṡ
we havė
Let
Then a sufficient condition forV
According to (12) , (26) means
that is
where δ L (·) is the operator that takes the minimum singular value and δ H (·) is the operator that takes the maximum singular value. Specifically, (29) 
, it follows that:
According to [44] , it has V ∞ i = V * i . Thus, the algorithm converges to V * i . Remark 1: In the above proof, if ∇V (29) is established, thenV
. Theorems 1 and 2 prove that the PI algorithm (Algorithm 1) is convergent. Note that in system (1), f (x) and g(x) are unknown, and therefore, Algorithm 1 in (10)- (12) cannot be used to obtain the Nash equilibrium for unknown system (1) directly. In this paper, an off-policy IRL method based on Algorithm 1 is established for multiplayer NZS games.
IV. OFF-POLICY INTEGRAL REINFORCEMENT LEARNING METHOD
From Algorithm 1, it can be seen that the PI algorithm depended on the system dynamics, which is not known in this paper. Therefore, the off-policy IRL algorithm is established to solve the NZS games. In this section, the off-policy IRL is first presented. Then the method for solving off-policy Bellman equation is developed. At last, the theoretical analyses and implement method are given.
A. Derivation of Off-Policy Algorithm
Let u [k] i be obtained by (12) , then the original system (1) can be rewritten aṡ
From (10), one has
Then (33) is given by
From (12), one has
Then the off-policy Bellman equation is obtained from (35)
Remark 2: Note that in (37), the term ∇V R ii , which can be obtained by measuring the state online. Therefore, (37) plays an important role in separating the system dynamics from the iterative process. It is referred to as the off-policy Bellman equation. By the off-policy Bellman equation (37) , one can obtain the optimal control of the N-player nonlinear differential game without the requirement of the system dynamics.
The off-policy IRL method is summed as follows.
The next section will give the implementation method for Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Off-Policy IRL
Step 1: Let the iterative index k = 0, select admissible controls u
Step 2: Let the iterative index k > 0, and solve for V 
B. Implementation Method for Off-Policy Algorithm
In this section, the method for solving off-policy Bellman equation (37) will be given. Critic and action networks are used to approximate V [k] i (x(t)) and u
for each player, respectively. The neural network expression of critic network is given as
where
is the ideal weight of critic network, ϕ i (x) is the active function, and ε
Define the neural network expression of action network as
is the ideal weight of action network, φ i (x) is the active function, and δ
Therefore, from (37), the equation error is defined as
Substituting (39) and (42) into (43), one can get
As
where the symbol ⊗ stands for Kronecker product, (44) becomes
Define
Therefore, (46) is written as
Let I
[k]
uu,i ] and
then (47) is given by
For obtaining the update rule of the weights of critic and action networks, the optimization objective is defined as
Thus, using the gradient descent algorithm, one can geṫ
where η [k] i is a positive number. Remark 3: According to gradient descent algorithm, the optimal weight W [k] i , which makes (49) minimum, can be obtained by (50). Therefore, the weights of critic and action networks are solved simultaneously. It means that only one equation is necessary instead of (10) and (11) in Algorithm 1 to obtain the optimal solution for the multiplayer NZS games.
C. Stability Analysis
In Theorems 1 and 2, the convergent property of the iterative cost function is proved. In the following theorems, one first proves that the weight estimation of critic and action networks will converge to the ideal ones within a small bound based on the off-policy IRL. Then one proves that the asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system and the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3: Let the update method for critic and action networks be as in (50), then ∀ k, i . Define the weight estimation error asW
is UUB.
Proof: Select Lyapunov function candidate as follows:
where l > 0.
According to (50), one haṡ
Thus, the gradient of (51) iṡ
That iṡ
Therefore, if l satisfies
is UUB. Based on Theorem 3, one can assume thatV
i (x). Then one can get the following theorem, which proves that the asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system further.
Theorem 4: Let the control be given as in (12) , then the closed-loop system is asymptotically stable.
Proof: Define Lyapunov function candidate as
Take the time derivative to obtaiṅ
Therefore, V [k] i (x(t)), ∀k is a Lyapunov function. The closedloop system is asymptotically stable.
From Theorem 4, it is clear that, ∀k, the iterative control {u [k] i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N } makes the closed-loop system stable asymptotically. Now, we are ready to give the following theorem, which demonstrates {u * i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N} is in Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5: For a fixed stabilizing control {u i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N }, define Hamiltonian function as in (6) . Let {u * i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N } be defined as in (7), then {u * i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, is in Nash equilibrium. Proof: As V i (x(∞)) = 0, then from (2), one has
According to (6) , (60) can be written as
which is given by (7), then
According to (6) , one has
Therefore, (61) is expressed as
Furthermore, (64) can be written as
Note that at the equilibrium point, one has u i = u * i and
From (65), one can get
Note that
Then, clearly
Based on above analyses, it is clear that off-policy IRL obtainsV
i (x) simultaneously. Based on the weight update method (50),V
i (x) makes the closed-loop system asymptotically stable and u
. . , N} is in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, in the following section, one is ready to give the following computational algorithm for practical online implementation.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
Here we present simulations of linear and nonlinear systems to show that the games can be solved by off-policy IRL method of this paper.
Example 1: Consider the following linear system with modification [45] , [46] :
(71) 
Step 2: Let k>0, solveŴ
Step 3: Update N-tuple of control policiesû
Step 4: Let k ← k + 1, repeat Step 2 until
where ε > 0 is a predefined constant threshold.
Step 5: Stop. Example 2: Consider the following nonlinear system in [47] with modification:
where After 1000 time steps, the state and control trajectories are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. Figs. 7-9 show value function for each player, which is monotonic decreasing.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper establishes an off-policy IRL method for CT multiplayer NZS games with unknown dynamics. Since the system dynamics is unknown in this paper, off-policy IRL is studied to do policy evaluation and policy improvement in PI algorithm. The critic and action networks are used to obtain the performance index and control for each player. The convergence of the weights is proved. The asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system and the existence of Nash equilibrium are proved. The simulation study demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method of this paper.
Furthermore, it is noted that the condition is hard for the proof of Theorem 2. In the next work, we will concentrate on relaxing the condition for the proof of Theorem 2. We also observe that the system unknown functions f and g are the same for each player in this paper. In our future work, we will discuss the off-policy IRL method for different unknown functions f i or g i for each player. This will make the research more extensive and deep.
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